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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~l!E STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
I J\GIL S. REDMOND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
19,401 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Criminal prosecution for allegedly uttering a factitious 
rheck. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant was sentenced to a term in the State Prison 
.ifter guilty verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a new trial and an order compelling 
:he prosecution to make available to him the other checks 
"f the same series as the check charged in the information 
·.\hi ch have been gathered up by the police and are being 
't;ppressed by the prosecution and withheld from de-
fendant. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During April, 1964, Tom Stoker, a witness for the 
prosecution, opened a bank account (R. 185) under the 
name of Prudential Federal Adjusters (R 186) in a Salt 
Lake City Bank (Ex. 2 & 3) by representing himself as 
"C. Coon" (Ex 1), had checks imprinted with that name 
(Rl88), typed a large number of checks on that account 
each for approximately the same amount, each naming 
C. J. McCall as payee and each of which he signed Carl 
J. Coon except the check herein charged which he signea 
Cal J. Coon. (R 267-268). Approximately 50 checks were 
negotiated over a week-end from that series. (R 268; 
One such check was cashed at Makoff's. Defendant is 
charg~d herein with uttering that check. 
The police and prosecution gathered up and withheld 
from defendant and his counsel all of the bank records 
pertaining to the bank account opened by Stoker and 
upon which said checks were drawn and all of the checks 
drawn on that account which were a part of the series 
mentioned above. (R 598). Without access to those rec· 
ords and checks defendant has been unable to learn the 
names of the persons who accepted checks of that series 
or to locate and identify persons who cashed those checks 
for use as witnesses to establish that it was a third person. 
and not the defendant, who cashed those checks and the 
check with which he is charged herein. (R 598) 
Prior to preliminary hearing of this matter Judge Beck 
ordered the County Attorney to furnish said checks and 
other requested information pursuant to a demand for a 
bill of particulars. The checks and records were not fur· 
nished and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint 
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for failure to furnish that information was heard before 
Judge Neeley who denied the motion. Judge Hanson of 
the District Court denied a petition for an extraordinary 
wnt to compel furnishing of said checks and his decision 
was affirmed by this Court on appeal. Redmond v. City 
Court, 17 U2d 95, 404 P2d 964. In that decision the Court 
underscored the fact that said proceeding was taken in 
connection with a preliminary hearing and noted that it 
was on a petition for an extraordinary writ, apparently 
to indicate that we were not to be precluded from raising 
those questions in this appeal. 
Defendant asked for substantially the same informa-
tion in a request for a bill of particulars in the District 
Court (R596-603). Extensive arguments were heard by 
the Court (R 597-602; R 606-618) prior to trial concern-
ing defendant's request for access to those checks, etc., 
however Judge Anderson ruled that evidence concerning 
checks other than the one charged in the information was 
not material to the issues in this case (R 615) after hear-
ing argument from the prosecution to the effect that evi-
dence concerning said other checks would be wholly in-
admissable at the trial and immaterial to the issues (R 
620-621) and denied defendant's motion for access to 
those checks. Defendant reasserted and reargued his mo-
tion for access to the other checks that were a part of 
said series of checks at the commencement of the trial 
(R 597-603; R 625), during the course of the trial (R 356-
59) and also his motions for a continuance (R 358) and 
for a mistrial (R 358), all of which were denied by the 
Court. 
At the time defendant was arrained the information 
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charged him with uttering a check for the payment , 
0, 
money of C. J. McCall ( R 1), however the informatior. 
was amended when a co-defendant was arrained to 
charge uttering a check for the payment of money of Cari 
J. Coon (R 1; R 605. Defendant has never been given a 
preliminary hearing on a charge pertaining to uttering ;i 
check for payment of money of Carl J. Coon. 
At the time of arrainment defendant requested that the 
witnesses called at the trial be limited to those listed or. 
the information or that defendant be furnished with the 
names of additional witnesses which the prosecution ir.-
tended to call at the time of trial. (R 607). The District 
Attorney agreed to furnish the names of additional v.it-
nesses to be called at the trial as soon as they becamf: 
known to him (R 607), however no additional names 
were endorsed on the information or furnished to the 
defendant. Defendant objected to calling of witnesses for 
the prosecution whose names had not been supplied (R 
355-358), moved for a continuance or mistrial (R 3581. 
however his motions were denied and approximately 14 
additional prosecution witnesses who were not named in 
the information and who had not testified at the prelim· 
inary hearing were permitted to testify for the State. 
Many of these witnesses were persons who had cashed 
other check which were a part of the series sought by 
defendant, and were persons whose names were withhelc 
from defendant by suppression of the other checks from 
defendant by the prosecution. Defendant had no oppor· 
tunity to prepare to meet the testimony of these addi· 
tional witnesses, much of which testimony was vague 
and indefinite. 
The Court permitted the prosecution to introduce 
5 
ether checks of the series which had been withheld by 
the prosecution from defendant into evidence and per-
:nitted persons whose identity had been withheld from 
,lefendant and suppressed by the State to testify and to 
:illegedly identify the defendant as the person who cashed 
.ither checks of the series sought by defendant. (Ex 4 & 
LJ 1 Defendant was unable to produce similar evidence 
from other persons who had cashed similar checks from 
,hat series because of suppression of the other checks 
; mm that series by the prosecution. 
POINT I 
IT IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO 
PERMIT THE PROSECUTION TO SUPPRESS EVI-
DENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT 
Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to 
defendant is a denial of due process, irrespective of the 
good or bad faith of the prosecution, 21 AM. Jur 2d, 
Criminal Law Sec. 225; 33 ALR2d 1421, and is a violation 
of the rights secured by the fifth amendments Curtis v. 
Rives, 75 Ap DC 66, 123 F2d 936 and of the fourteenth 
amendment to the U.S. constitution. Mooney v. Holohan, 
~94 US 103, 79 L.3d 79 L.ed. 791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406, 
reh den 294 US 732, 79 L. ed 1261 55 S Ct 511; Pyle v. 
Kansas, Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 US 103, 79 L. ed. 
791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406, reh den 294 US 732, 79 L. 
ed. 1261, 55 S Ct 511; Pyle v. Kansas (1942) 317 US 213, 
87 L. ed. 214, 63 S Ct 177; White Thunder v. Hunter (1945 
CA 10th Kan) 149 R3d 578, cert den 325 US 889, 89 L. ed. 
2002, 65 S Ct 1579, 141 F2d 500; Pyle v. Amrine (1945) 
195 Kan 458 156 P2d 509. cert den 328 US 749, 90 L. ed. 
' 
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448, 66 S Ct 45, reh den 326 US 809, 90 L. ed. 493, 66 S 
Ct 165; U. S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen (1949, DC Ill) 
86 F. Supp 382; Woollomes v. Heinze (1952, CA 9th Cal) 
198 F2d 577, cert den 344 US 929, 97 L. ed 715, 73 s Ct 
499; Burns v. Lovett (1952) 91 App DC 208, 202 F2d 335 
affd 346 US 137, 97 L. ed. 1508, 73 S Ct 1045; White v: 
Ragen, 324 US 760, 764, 65 S Ct 978, 89 L. ed. 1348; Hysler 
v. Florida, 315 US 411, 413, 316 US 642, 62 S Ct 688, 86 , 
L. ed. 932; Jones v. Kentucky, 6 Cir, 97 F2d 335, 333 , 
Soulia v. O'Brien, DC Mass, 94 F Supp 764. State courts 
considering deliberate suppression of evidence favorable 
to the accused have generally held that such conduct is a 
denial of due process. Morhous v. Supreme Court of New 
York (1944) 293 NY 131, 56 NE2d 79; People v. Whitman 
( 1945) 185 Misc 459, 56 NYS2d 709, 177 P2d 918. 
Suppression by prosecution after request by defense of 
accomplice's confession violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment where accomplice's confes· 
sion admitted that he had actually strangled the victim. 1 
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 US 83, 10 Led 2d 215; 83 
S Ct 1194. Withholding of requested statement given to 
police which contained admission by a prosecution wit· 
ness which was favorable and vitually material to de· 
fense was held to be a deniel of due process. US ex rel. 
Butler v. Maroney (1963, CA3 Pa) 319 F2d 622. Sup· 
pression of evidence, including a bullet, that tended to 
show that the defendant did not fire the fatal shot where 
evidence is material as to punishment is a denial of due 
process. US ex rel Almeida v. Baldi (1952, CA3 Pa) 195 
F2d 815, 33 ALR2d 1407, cert den 345 US 904, 97 Led 
1341 73 S Ct 639 reh den 345 US 946, 97 L ed 1371, 73 S > ) I 
Ct 828. Refusal after request to produce pair of mens 
7 
shorts that did not belong to defendant, found in hotel 
room in prosecution for killing of a woman in that room 
held to be denial of due process where the evidence is 
material either as to guilt or as to punishment. People v. 
Hoffman ( 1965) 32 Ill 2d 96, 203 NE2d 873. See also Bar-
bee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (1964, CA4 Md) 
331 F2d 842. Failure to reveal laboratory report favor-
able to accused held to be denial of the fairness required 
under the due process clause of the constitution. People 
'·"Whitmore, (1965) 45 Misc 2d 506, 257 NYS2d 787. The 
court observed in State v. Cook (1965) 43 NJ 560, 206 
A2d 350 in a case involving withholding of a medical 
report of the state's psychiatrist that a prosecuting at-
torney must deal fairly and may not constitutionally 
withhold material evidence which favors the defendant. 
In People v. Preston (1958) 13 Misc 802, 176 NYS2d 542 
involving withholding of hospital and autopsy reports 
the court stated that any action or omission by the dis-
trict attorney which prevents a defendant from present-
ing evidence which may establish his innocence may re-
sult in a denial of due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
See also annotations at 33 ALR2d 1421 and 7 ALR3d 8, 
32 and cases there annotated and discussed for extensive 
discussion and digest of law. The law is clear that sup-
pression of evidence favorable to the accused in a crim-
inal trial is a denial of due process. 
In this case the prosecution through the police depart-
ment systematically gathered up the bank records, all of 
the checks that had been cashed as a part of the alleged 
scheme of which the checg which defendant purportedly 
uttered was a part and withheld that evidence from de-
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fendant notwithstanding demands for a bill of particulars 
prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 2 & 3). An appeal to 
this court in an attempting to secure that information 
prior to preliminary hearing, (Redmond v. Salt Lake City 
Court, et al 17 U2d 95, 404 P2d 964), a demand for a bill 
of particulars prior to trial (R. 2-3), extensive arguments 
thereon (R. 597-620; R 606-618) and various motions, ob-
jections and requests for continuances (R. 358; R 401-403) 
and for declaration of a mistrial (R. 358; R 401-403) failed 
to produce said information required for defendant to 
prepare his defense. 
In a recent Utah case in the Federal District Court for 
Utah it was held that the prosecution having caused the 
doctor to testify in such a manner as to leave impression 
that rape had been committed when he was of the opin-
ion that sodomy but not rape had been committed on the 
victim constituted a suppression of evidence in violation 
of due process. The defendant was ordered released from 
custody, subject to further action by the state. Turner v. 
Ward, CAlO Utah 321F2d918. 
POINT II 
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF THE 
EVIDENCE SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT IS CON-
TRARY TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AS ANNOUNCED BY THE LEGISLATURE 
The legislature of the State of Utah has declared that 
the fair administration of justice requires that evidence 
sought by any party in any legal proceeding shall not be 
concealed by any person with intent to prevent its pro-
duction at that legal proceeding and has made it a crime 
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for any person to destroy or conceal any such evidence. 
The question of admissability of such evidence is proper-
ly left to the Court who may accept or reject the pre-
offered evidence when it is offered at the legal proceed-
ing. The intentional concealment of such evidence to 
prevent its "production" at the proceeding is denounced 
by law. 76-28-39, UCA, 1953 reads as follows: 
"76-28-39. DESTROYING OR CONCEALING EVI-
DENCE. - Every person who, knowing that any book; 
paper, instrumentin writing or other matter or thing 
is about to be produced in evidence, upon any trial, 
inquiry or investigation whatever authorized by law, 
willfully destroys or conceals the same, with intent 
thereby to prevent it from being produced is guilty of 
a misdemeanor." 
If Redmond had in some manner obtained possession 
of exhibit P-4 or other evidence which the prosecution 
wanted to produce at the trial of this matter, whether 
that information were actually admitted by the court 
when offered or not, we reasonably could have expected 
that a complaint would have been issued against him 
charging a violation of 76-28-39, UCA, 1953 (supra). The 
statute creates no exception in favor of the prosecution 
which would permit suppression or concealment of evi-
dence by the prosecution of evidence which Redmond 
tried diligently to obtain for presentation at his trial, but 
which evidence was gathered up by the prosecution for 
purposes of concealing it from Redmond. If the true in-
tent of the statute is to be carried out Redmond is en-
titled to access to any available evidence which he wants 
to produce in evidence at the trial, whether it is in the 
possession of a third party or the prosecution. The right 
to access to such evidence necessarily requires that it be 
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made available to him in sufficient time to permit him 
to investigate other evidence and testimony which may 
become known to him from that evidence. In this case it 
was necessary for Redmond to have access to the checks 
so that he could determine the identity of the persons who 
cashed the checks, interview those persons as possible 
witnesses and submit the checks to a handwriting expert 
to establish that the identity of the person who cashed 
each such check and placed the endorsement thereon was 
the same as the person who actually cashed the check 
with which he is charged in this case. 
POINT III 
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE BY PROSECUTION 
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A "FAIR TRIAL" GUAR-
ANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE 
UTAH AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
A defendant in a criminal case comes into court clothed 
with the presumption of innocence (77-31-4, UCA, 1953) 
and the state is required to prove his guilt beyond area-
sonable doubt or he is entitled to an acquittal (77-31-4, 
UCA, 1953). Reasonable doubt may result from either the : 
failure of the prosecution to produce sufficient proof or 
from evidence adduced by the defendant which creates a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In a recent case this 
court has stated that: 
" ... the rights of one accused of crime are in no wise 
to be belittled nor ignored. The fundamental purpose 
of a criminal trial is not solely to convict the accused. 
1 
It is to seek the truth and administer justice ... " , 
State v. Faux, 9 U 2d 350, 345 P2d 186. 
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In this case Redmond was denied the right to obtain 
the names of witnesses who had cashed other checks of 
the same series, approximate amount, drawn by the same 
person to the same payee and cashed at about the same 
time by the use of the same identification. He was also 
denied to copies of those checks which had been gathered 
up and suppressed by the prosecution. This denied him 
access to that evidence which was vital to the preparation 
and presentation of his defense by enabling him to iden-
tify the persons who cashed the other similar check of 
the same who could be called as witnesses to establish 
the fact that Redmond not the person who cashed the 
checks. By a handwriting expert he could link the checks 
together to establish that all of the checks of that series, 
including the check charged in the information were 
cashed and endorsed by the same person (R601). Cer-
tainly such evidence would at least tend to establish a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to his guilt. 
The Court erroneously ruled that such evidence was 
relevant but not material and refused to require the 
prosecution to permit Redmond to inspect those checks, 
yet permitted that very evidence to be introduced into 
evidence at the trial by the prosecution. 
Didn't this action deny Redmond the rights guaranteed 
by 77-31-4, UCA, 1953 with respect to the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt by refusing to permit him to 
establish evidence which may well have established a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. Wouldn't such 
evidence have convinced the jury of Redmonds innocence 
guaranteed by 77-31-4, UCA, 1953 when it denies a de-
fendant the right to evidence favorable to the accused 
which he has requested from the prosecution and thereby 
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impliedly substitute a presumption of guilt by infering 
that since the defendant is guilty anyway he cannot be 
prejudiced by refusal of discovery since all his counsel 
needs to do is to ask him what he did to prepare his de-
fense. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT ACCESS TO CHECKS IN THE POSSES-
SION OF THE PROSECUTION TO PREPARE HIS 
DEFENSE 
The Utah Statute pertaining to the right of a defendant 
to a bill of particulars (77-21-9), UCA, 1953) recognizes 
the right of a defendant to limited discovery in criminal 
cases by permitting the defendant to obtain additional: 
"facts" which the court deems to be" . . . in the in-
terest of justice ... " 
That statute sets a standard for the Court in applying 
the statute by stating: 
"In determining whether such facts, and if so, what 
facts, should be so furnished, the court shall consider 
the whole record and the entire course of the pro-
ceedings against the defendant." 
This court recognized that discovery in criminal cases 
is properly the function of the court in State v. Faux per-
taining to screening of transcript of grand jury hearing 
(supra). This procedure recognized that problems may 
exist in a particular case which might make it unwise to 
grant certain discovery in unusual criminal cases and 
leaves the question of whether unusual circumstances 
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exist in a particular case which would justify denying 
discovery to the sound discretion of the trial judge who 
is close to the problems in a particular case. Utah is one 
of the few states that has a workable procedure in the 
statutes which will permit a workable realistic criminal 
discovery by the defendant. This procedure has been con-
servatively applied and little used in Utah until the State 
v. Faux case (supra). 
In England and Canada criminal discovery is virtually 
unlimited. No evidence is permitted at the trial that was 
not presented at the preliminary hearing without notice 
to the defendant. In 1792 pretrial inspection of documents 
was sought by a high official of the East India Company 
charged with malfeasance and corruption but was denied 
with the outraged comment of the then Lord Chief Jus-
tice that to grant such a request would "subvert the 
whole system of criminal law," however by 1883 Sir 
James Stephen was able to say that this was barbarian-
ism not to be tolerated in a decent criminal procedure. 
See Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 
at page 59. The fears expressed by opponents of liberal 
discovery in criminal cases appear unfounded when we 
examine the results of the Canadian procedure and the 
similarity between the conditions in Canada and the 
United States. California has established extremely 
liberal discovery good results and without the problems 
forseen by opponents of liberal discovery procedure. Our 
experience in liberal discovery procedure in civil cases is 
a good illustration of the benefits derived and the effec-
tiveness of judicial supervision of discovery to prevent 
abuses. Criminal discovery need not be a one way street 
as illustrated by the California ruling that neither the 
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privilege against self-incrimination nor the attorney. 
client privilege are violated if the defendant is required 
to disclose in advance only what he himself intends to 
disclose at the time of the trial. Jones v. Superior Court , 
58 Cal. 2d56, 22 Cal. Pptr 879, 372 P. 2d 919. 
Opponents of liberal criminal discovery argue that his 
is a one-way street with no benefits to the prosecution. 
Does not the prosecution benefit from a sharpening of 
the issues, exposure of untenable arguments, more ef-
ficient marshalling of evidence, disposing of more cases 
without trial and from the important public interest in 
the acquital of the innocent. Similar benefits have been 
derived from statutes requiring notice to the prosecution 
of alibi and insanity defenses, which in itself is a form is 
discovery for the prosecution. Does not refusal of dis-
covery eliminate the chance to prove the truth as well 
as the false. The argument that the dishonest accused 
may abuse rights of discovery by perjury, intimidation, 
etc. when such an argument prevents also prevents the 
honest accused from the opportunity to clear himself. In 
a recent case this Court stated: 
" ... all fair-minded persons will concede that ulti-
mately the full truth should be revealed to the court 
and jury. In such instance the truism should be rec-
ognized that the truth should have nothing to fear 
from light." State v. Faux (supra) 
Soviet prosecutors vigorously objected to adoption of 
the prevailing American rules of discovery in the Nuem-
berg war crime trial on grounds that they are just "not 
fair to defendants." The result was compromise pro-
cedure which permitted the accused at those trial more 
liberal discovery than allowed under American Law, al-
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though apparently narrower than Soviet or French prac-
tice sanctions. 33 F.R.D. 47 at P. 59. 
Discovery under prevailing criminal procedure in the 
United States is a one-way street, with the state being 
permitted to build its case against the accused in its 
leisure without real concern for cost and with the aid 
of governmental power, experts, science and implied 
threats of holding a person as a material witness or of 
charging him with one of the vague conspiracy, acces-
sory, principal or other statutes if he does not cooperate 
with the state in its discovery procedure. The large num-
ber of complaints of police abuses by interrogation, the 
large number of guilty pleas or convictions resulting 
from confessions induced by threat, promise, pressure, 
interrogation, etc. indicate that the state exercises ex-
tensive discovery procedure even against the accused. 
The presumption of innocence and burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt fall short of counterbalancing 
the advantages of the prosecution in a criminal case. 
In this case the law theoretically gave Redmond the 
theoretical presumption of innocence and right to ac-
quittal if a reasonable doubt as to proof of his guilt ex-
isted, however by withholding from him the evidence 
necessary to present a defense which would establish his 
innocence or a reasonable doubt makes this right: 
" ... ineffectual and but an empty deluision, unworth 
of our standards of fairness to both sides in such a 
trial." State v. Faux, (supra). 
If we deny him the right to discovery we are in es-
sence saying that he has no cause to complain because he 
knows what he did and does not need discovery anyway. 
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Again the right becomes an "empty delusion" and "in-
effectual," State v. Faux (supra). The Court recognized 
that the evidence sought by Redmond was "Relevant" 
(R. 616), ruled that this evidence would be inadmissable 
at the trial and denied his right to obtain that evidence 
which the prosecution was withholding, although the 
Court allowed the prosecution to present a part of that 
very evidence at the trial (Ex 4 & 9) over Redmonds ob-
jections. (R 597-603; R 356-359; 401-403). 
POINT V 
INFORMAL DISCOVERY AT DISCRETION OF PROS-
ECUTOR NOW IN WIDE USE IS A DENIAL OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAWS GUARAN-
TEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND BY 
ART. 1, SECTIONS 2 AND 24 UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The amount of information available in a criminal 
case where this matter is left to the discretion of the 
prosecution will vary according to (1) who the prose-
cutor is, (2) who the defense counsel is, (3) who the de-
fendant is, ( 4) whether the prosecution believes that it 
has a strong or weak case and ( 5) many other unknown 
factors which may be present in a particular case. This 
court has denounced as "dangerous" a procedure where-
by the prosecution would "screen" evidence to be made 
available to the defendant and has held that this function 
is a judicial function to be performed by the Court. 
State v. Faux (Supra). The right to discovery of evidence 
in a criminal case should be afforded to everyone or to no 
one. Our legislature has very wisely placed the discretion 
in the trial judge to determine what information should 
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be open to discovery in a criminal case (77-21-9, UCA, 
1953). The defendant believes that the Court abused 
that discretion too narrow of a construction on that 
statute in this case and that for this reason the defendant 
should be granted a new trial with instruction to the 
court to permit him to have access to the other checks 
issued apparently as a part of the plan or scheme by the 
persons who perpetrated the fraud as requested by de-
fendant in his demand for a bill of particulars (R. 2-3). 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITIING THE STATE 
TO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE A CHECK OF "CAL J. 
COON" 
The information (R. 1) and the instructions of the 
Court to the jury (R. 121, 129, 130) all refer to the fic-
titious person involved in the alleged offense as a "Carl 
J. Coon", however the alleged fictitious instrument 
charged in the information (Exhibit P.6) bears the sig-
nature of a "Cal J. Coon." The information was amended 
to strike the name C. J. McCall and substitute therefor 
the name Carl J. Coon after this defendant had been 
arrained and before the trial, (R. 605) however the pre-
liminary hearing was limited to consideration of a charge 
of utter a check for the payment of money of C. J. McCall. 
The posture of the case and the evidence is insufficient 
as a matter of law to sustain a conviction of the defendant 
for the following reasons: 
(a) Defendant has not waived and has not been given 
a preliminary hearing on the charges for which he was 
convicted in violation of 77-23-3 (2) (a) and Art I, Sec. 
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13, Constitution of Utah. The preliminary hearing was 
limited to a charge of uttering a fictitious instrument for 
the payment of money of C. J. McCall. He was convicted 
of uttering a fictitious instrument for the payment of 
money of Carl J. Coon. It may be that each of these al-
leged offenses would constitute a separate crime in 
properly charged and proven, however the court lacks 
jurisdiction to try the defendant and it is error to try 
the defendant on a charge different from the charge 
contained in the complaint at the preliminary hearing. 
State v. Freeman, 93 U. 125, 71P.2d196; State v. Jensen, 
103 U. 478, 136 P.2d 949; State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 338, 
142 P.2d 178, 180; State v. Nelson, 52 U. 617, 176 P. 860. 
The limitation on the jurisdiction cf the Court to try 
Redmond without holding or waiving a preliminary hear-
ing is further illustrated by Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Utah 
Constitution which reads in part as follows: 
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this 
Constitution, ... " 
Art. I, Sec. 13 reads in part as follows: 
"Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by in-
diction, shall be prosecuted by information a~er ex-
amination and commitment by a magistrate, unless 
the examination be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State ... " 
The information to which Redmond entered a plea 
charged him with uttering a check for the payment of 
money of C. J. McCall. (R. 1, R. 596-597) It was not until 
a later date when a co-defendant who is not involved in 
this appeal was arrained that the information was 
amended to charge the offense with which Redmond 
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stands convicted. (R. 605) Since the amendment oc-
curred after Redmond had entered his plea the provi-
sions of 77-23-10, UCA, 1953 with respect to waiver of 
his right to object to the failure to hold or waive a pre-
liminary hearing concerning charges in the information 
are not applicable to our situation. To the extent that 
said statute purports to limit the right to preliminary 
hearing guaranteed to the defendant by Art. I, Sec. 13 
quoted above, that statute is unconstitutional and void. 
A motion was made by defendant which was in legal 
effect a motion for arrest of judgment after the verdict 
of the jury was read and before the defendant was called 
for imposition of judgment (R. 592 in accordance with 
the provisions of 77-34-1, UCA, 1953, 77-23-10, UCA, 
1953 also purports to effect a waiver of the right to a 
preliminary hearing if the defendant shall fail to object 
to the information on that ground prior to entry of his 
plea to the information, however that statute is also in-
applicable since Redmond had no cause to object to the 
information at the time that he was arraigned and en-
tered his plea to the information, however that statute 
to the information at the time that he was arraigned and 
entered his plea since the information charged the same 
offense as had been charged in the complaint at the pre-
liminary hearing. It appears that the cases which hold 
that the defendant has waived irregularities with respect 
to the preliminary hearing or lack thereof by not object-
ing prior to entry of his plea to the information are not 
germaine to the issue herein involved because they are 
based on the waiver provisions of 77-23-3 (2) (a) and 
77-16-2, UCA, 1953 where defendant has entered plea to 
information and those statutes simply do not apply to 
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this defendant since he has never entered a plea or been 
arraigned on an information wherein he was charged 
with uttering a check for the payment of money of Carl 
J. Coon. He entered a plea to an information charging 
him with uttering such an instrument of C. J. McCall, a 
separate and distinct offense. Accordingly the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to try and pass judgment upon this 
defendant by reason of those basic defects in procedure. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO 
CALL WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES HAD NOT BEEN 
INDORSED ON THE INFORMATION AND WHO 
WERE PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN TO DEFENDANT 
77-21-52. U.C.A., 1953 provides in part as follows: 
"Where an information or indictment is filed, the 
names of all the witnesses or deponents on whose 
evidence the information or indictment was based 
shall be indorsed thereon before it is presented, and 
the prosecuting attorney shall endorse on the infor-
mation or indictment at such time as the court may 
by rule or otherwise prescribe the names of such 
other witnesses as he proposes to call.*** No con-
tinuance shall be allowed because of the failure to 
indorse any of the said names unless such applica-
tion (to have the names indorsed) was made at the 
earliest opportunity and then only if a continuance 
is necessary in the interest of justice." 
Section 77-17-4 requires that the names of those testi-
fying at a preliminary hearing be indorsed on an informa-
tion. These two statutes clearly evidence an intention 
that defendant is not to be faced with a host of unknown 
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witnesses at the time of trial whose character, back-
ground, reliability, etc., and testimony are totally or par-
tially unknown to him. It is not the intent of the ad-
versary system under present principles and practice 
that a trial be conducted in an atmosphere of surprise, 
chicanery and maneuvering. The code explicitly requires 
that the names of witnesses be made available to de-
fendant before trial. The purpose of indorsement of 
names of witnesses is to advise the defendant who the 
witnesses are. State v. Faux (supra). This right has been 
held to be a substantial one People v. Lee, 12 N.W.2d 418, 
307 Mich 743; People v. Smith, 241 N.W. 186, 257 Mich 
319; People v. Tamosaitis, 221 N.W. 307, 244 Mich 258, 
and the requirement should be faithfully observed by 
the prosecuting attorney. People v. Tamosaitis, supra. 
The defendant demanded the names of all witnesses 
for the prosecution and Mr. Jay Banks, District Attorney, 
expressly agreed to promptly furnish the names of any 
witness other than the four indorsed on the information 
which the state intended to call (R 607). No additional 
names were ever furnished defendant not indorsed on the 
information prior to the time of trial, yet fourteen addi-
tional witnesses were called by the state. These witnesses 
should not have been allowed to testify, over defendants 
objections or if it were shown by the state that they were 
not known prior to the trial, then a continuance should 
have been allowed in order for defendant to prepare to 
meet their testimony as requested by defendant (R 358; 
401-403) Many of these were the very people defendant 
had sought to discover prior to trial, and which the state 
had refused to disclose. Their testimony had previously 
been ruled immaterial by the trial court. (R-615) 
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In Cohn v. State (Okla. 1913), 135 P. 115, the state had 
called a witness whose name had not been indorsed on the 
information and who had not been discovered until after 
the commencement of the trial. The court said at page 
1156: 
"It is clearly shown that the witness Van Tress was 
not discovered until the noon recess of the court 
after the case had been put on trial. The assistant 
county attorney made a clear showing that he was 
entitled to have the testimony of this witness. The 
court did not err in permitting his name to be in-
dorsed, and allowing him to testify. If counsel had 
asked for a continuance for the purpose of securing 
evidence to meet that of this witness, it would have 
been the duty of the court to grant ii(;; but no such re-
quest was made. If the record disclosed facts which 
indicated that the county attorney had acted unfair, 
and was purposely holding back information relative 
to the witness, then a reversal would be warranted 
" 
Defendant, in the instant case, has sought to learn the 
names of witnesses having information bearing upon the 
identity of the persons who accepted other checks of the 
same series as the one of which defendant is accused. 
These checks were gathered up from various merchants 
by the police and were in the hands of the prosecution, 
and not available to defendant from any other source. 
The prosecution, has deliberately concealed these names 
of witnesses to be called by the Prosecution from de-
fendant, and has purposely failed to abide by their agree-
ment to supply the names of additional witnesses, to in-
dorse their names on the information or to appraise de-
fendant of the state's intention to call them at trial. The 
record clearly discloses facts which indicate that the 
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prosecution acted unfair and purposely withheld infor-
mation relative to the additional 14 witnesses who were 
called to testify at the trial for the prosecution. Under 
the holding of the Cohn case, supra, a reversal would be 
warranted. 
The advisability of reversal is even more clearly per-
ceived when the purpose of the indorsement or furnish-
ing of the names of prosecution witnesses is considered. 
It has been stated that the purpose includes, among other 
things, the following objectives: 
(1) That accused may properly prepare for trial by 
knowing something of history, antecedents, and char-
acter of witness who are to be produced. State v. King, 
182 P.2d. 915, 66 Ariz. 42; 
( 2) To guard accused against the production of persons 
who are unknown and whose character he should have 
an opportunity to canvass. People v. Quich, 25 N.W. 302, 
58 Mich, 321; 
(3) To appraise accused of his accusers and give the 
defendant an opportunity before trial to interview such 
witnesses and time to prepare to meet their testimony. 
State v. Fedder, 285 P.2d. 802, 76 Idaho 535. 
( 4) A witness should not be permitted to testify in 
chief over objection of defendant, until his name is en-
dorsed upon information, unless such endorsement is 
waived. Evans v. State, 312 P. 2d 908 (Okl. Cr.) 
( 5) The purpose of the statute requiring the county 
attorney to endorse upon the information at the time of 
filing the names of witnesses for the state, if known is 
to protect the defendant from surprise and unfair ad-
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vantage and to afford him a fair opportunity to adequate-
ly defend himself. State v. Cooper, 406 p.2d 691 (Mont.); 
State v. Phillips, 264 P.2d 1009, 127 Mont. 381. 
(6) The purpose of requiring the endorsement of 
names upon indictment at time of presentment is to ad-
vise the defendant of persons who will give evidence in 
the trial against him and grand jury witness, whose name 
is not endorsed on indictment, may not testify over de-
fendant's objection. State v. McDonald, 361 P. 2d 1001 
(or.) 
In the instant case, defendant was never given an op-
portunity to investigate the background, character his-
tory etc., of the 14 witnesses called unexpectedly by the 
state. He was given no opportunity to prepare to meet 
their testimony. There was no reason why these names 
could not have been made available to defendant except 
the desire to obtain every possible advantage for the 
prosecution at the time of trial. The state has evidence 
bad faith which bad faith would warrant a reversal 
under the doctrine of the Cohn case, supra. The argu-
ment presented by the prosecution in opposition to de-
fendant's motion for evidence which would have enabled 
defendant to learn the names of many of these surprise 
witnesses, was in essence an argument that since the 
other checks of the series which these witnesses had 
cashed were immaterial to the issues in the case the de-
fendant had no need for that information, (R 597-602; 
R 606-618). This argument persuaded the judge that evi-
dence concerning the other checks and persons who ac-
cepted those other checks of the same series was im-
material (R. 620-621) since the prosecution did not in-
tend to present evidence concerning said other checks as 
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a direct result the defendant was refused access to those 
other checks. (R. 597-602; R 606-618). 
The unfairness to the defendant resulting from the 
failure of the prosecution to furnish names of additional 
witness which it had agreed to furnish to defendant, the 
representations a motions prior to trial to the effect that 
none of the other checks would be used in evidence at the 
trial, the resulting denial to the defendant of evidence 
necessary for him to defend himself against the surprise 
witnesses and the refusal of the court to give the de-
fendant any relief from this situation (R. 401-403) il-
lustrate the fact that Redmond was in fact denied his 
right to a "fair trial," was not afforded "due process of 
law," and was unfairly surprised by the surprise witness-
es produced by the prosecution. At the very least de-
fendant was entitled to a continuance of the trial to give 
him an opportunity to meet the surprise witnesses and 
evidence, which the Court denied R 401-403; R. 358, not-
withstanding the language contained in 77-21-52, UCA, 
1953 (supra), and requires that a new trial be ordered. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO 
INTRODUCE PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES AFTER 
PRECIOUSLY RULING THAT SUCH EVIDENCE 
WOULD BE IMMATERIAL AND INADMISSIBLE 
The state, over defendant's vigorous objection (R 401-
403; R 358) was allowed to introduce evidence concern-
ing several other checks of the same series for the pur-
pose of establishing the defendant's identity as the per-
son who allegedly cashed the check charged in the in-
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formation. After previously having ruled that such evi-
dence would be immaterial and hence inadmissible, (R 
620-621) and on that ground denying defendant an op-
portunity to secure such evidence then in the possession 
of the state (R 597-602; R 606-618; R 401-403) it was 
clearly error to allow the state at the time of trial, with-
out any notice to defendant, to introduce such evidence. 
This is just a matter of simple fairness, so obvious that 
there is a veritable dearth of reported cases on this par-
ticular point. Counsel was able to find only three in the 
whole reporter system. 
In a New Jersey case, 1965, the defendant had entered 
an insanity plea to a murder prosecution and then ob-
jected to examination by psychiatrists for the state. The 
court held (Headnote 13): 
"If a defendant is capable mentally of cooperating to 
extend deemed necessary by doctors who are ex-
amining defendant on behalf of state for purposes of 
forming an opinion as to defendant's sanity, and de-
fendant fails or refuses to cooperate on motion of 
state the defense psychiatric testimony shall be lim-
ited to same extent. "State v. Whitlow, 210 A.2d. 
763." 
In Commonwealth v. Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305, 12 S.W. 
550 (1889) where the defendants testimony as to an al-
leged conversation with a certain person was excluded, 
it was held proper to refuse to allow the other person to 
testify thereto. 
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POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING OTHER CHECKS 
OF THE SAME SERIES, DRAWN ON THE SAME 
BANK ACCOUNT, PAYABLE TO THE SAME PAYEE, 
AND CASHED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME WITH 
THE SAME IDENTIFICATION WERE INADMISS-
ABLE. 
In ruling on the admissability of the additional checks, 
and evidence related thereto, which defendant had sought 
to have produced for inspection and examination before 
trial R 597-603; 608-620; 622 the court erroneously con-
cluded that these checks, and the circumstances sur-
rounding their negotiation was "relevant but not ma-
terial" R 617. Defendant had sought to have these checks 
produced for inspection before trial in order to establish 
the true identity of the person cashing them through 
means of handwriting experts to show that the same 
person endorsed and cashed all checks of the series and 
by means of testimony of the individuals who had ac-
cepted the said other checks whom defendant proposed 
to produce as witnesses to testify that he did not cash 
said checks (R 597-603; 608-620). 
The state argued that the identity of persons cashing 
other similar checks had absolutely no bearing on the 
prosecution for uttering the particular check for which 
defendant was charged. The court accepted this reason-
ing, stating that " ... it wouldn't matter whether or not 
he was recognized as having uttered other instruments 
bearing the same instrument (sic) or other persons had 
uttered instruments which he had signed." (R 615) on 
page 616 of the record, the court stated: "Whether or not 
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in a given case a defendant has evidence to establish that 
similar instruments, also fictitious were executed bv 
someone other than himself wouldn't make any dif-
ference," and later stated "I'd have to conclude that these 
other checks would not be admissible under the charge 
of uttering. I couldn't visualize how they might produce 
these other checks so far as execution of them as such 
evidence bearing upon defendant uttering this particular 
instrument, and if that's correct, and I think it is, it's 
maybe relevant but it's not material to the issue." (R 617) 
Counsel for defendant then stated: "Your Honor, un-
less we have these checks or at least the names of the 
ladies to whom they were issued, we can't even learn 
the identity of the people who cashed them." The court 
replied: "That would be of no consequence." (R 617) 
The checks, and the testimony of the persons who had 
accepted them, were clearly material, relevant to the is-
sues, and should have been held admissable. In fact when 
the state offered testimony concerning additional checks 
at the time of trial, the court correctly held that they 
were admissible. (R 131, 188, 191, 211, 238) As a general 
rule, evidence of other similar crimes committed by the 
defendant is admissable to prove the commission of the 
offense charged. There are certain well grounded excep-
tions, however. Thus is People v. Harvey, (N.Y., 1923) 
139 N.E. 268, 235 N.Y. 282, the court stated: 
" . . . the people cannot prove the offense charged by 
showing the commission of earlier or subsequent of-
fenses. To this rule there are the exceptions which 
have been many times given by the court and which 
were stated in People v. Moliniux, supra. We said 
'The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with cat-
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egorical prec1s10n. Generally speaking, evidence of 
other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime 
charged when it tends to establish (1) Motive; (2) 
intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) 
a common scheme or plan embracing the commission 
of two or more crimes so related to each other that 
proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the 
identity of the person charged with the commission 
of the crime on trial 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 
294 ( 62 L.R.A. 193)" 
See also State v. Bock 39 N.W. 2d. 887 (Minn. 1949); 
State v. Stuart, 203 Minn. 301, 281 N.W. 299; State v. 
Lucken 129 Minn. 402, 152 N.W. 769; State v. Barrett 40 
Minn. 65, 41 N.W. 459, State v. Sweeny 180 Minn. 450, 
231 N.W. 225, 73 A.L.R. 380, and the annotations in 3 
A.L.R. 1540; 22 A.L.R. 1540; 22 A.L.R. 1016; 27 A.L.R. 
357; 63 A.L.R. 602. 
The state, introduced additional checks in order to at-
tempt to establish a common scheme or plan embracing 
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each 
other that proof of one tended to establish the proof of 
the other, and to establish the identity of the defendant 
as the person who cashed the check charged herein. This 
was the very reason for which defendant had sought to 
obtain the checks except that defendant would have used 
them to negative the identification made by the state's 
witnesses. 
In State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d. 887, twenty seven checks 
and a check protector had been stolen from General Roof-
ing Company. The next day a man presented one of the 
stolen checks drawn on General's account in the amount 
of $62.20 payable to Harold A. Camden. The cashier stated 
that she would have to call the bank and confirm the 
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check, the man excused himself left the store and failed 
to return. The check was never indorsed. At the trial, over 
the defendant's objection, three other checks were intro-
duced and witnesses identified the defendant as having 
passed them. The defendant's defense was alibi that he 
was at home when the checks were passed. He attempted 
to introduce two checks cashed on the same day as the 
check for which he was charged, in the identical amount 
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and payable to the same payee. He sought to show by 
the clerks who received the checks that the person who 
presented them was not the defendant. The Minnesota 
court said: 
"Proof of similar acts constituting separate and dis-
tinct crimes is admissible under an exception to the 
general rule, not for the purpose of showing spe-
cifically that defendant committed the crime with 
which he has been charged, but for the purpose of 
permitting the trier of facts to draw an inference 
from the evidence showing a general plan or scheme 
consisting of a series of acts similar to that with 
which defendant is charged, that he did commit the 
crime with which he is charged. 2 Witmore, Evi-
dence, 3dED. Section 304. In determining defendant's 
guilt, the identity of the person who presented ex-
hibit A is the decisive factor. Inasmuch as an in-
ference that defendant uttered exhibit A is pennis-
sible from evidence showing that he passed exhibits 
B, D, and F, there appears no good reason why an 
opposite inference that defendant was not the per-
son who offered exhibit A is not permissable from a 
showing that checks identical with exhibit A were 
offered or passed on the same day and in a like man· 
ner by someone other than defendant. In discussing 
this question, Wigmore, in his work on evidence 3d. 
ed., Section 304 has this to say: 'It should be noted 
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that this kind of evidence may be also available to 
negative the accused's guilt. E.g. if A is charged with 
forgery and denies it, and if B can be shown to have 
done a series of similar forgeries connected by a plan, 
this plan of B is some evidence that B and not A 
committed the forgery charged. This mode of reason-
ing may become the most important when A alleges 
that he is a victim of mistaken tdentification.' " Again 
in Id. Section 341, p. 245 we find the following: 
'Notice that here, as throughout this series of of-
fenses, the principle of similar acts (ante section 304) 
can be used to exonerate an innocent accused, where 
the acts evidencmg the plan are those of a third per-
son not the defendant. ' " 
The court then quoted with approval Commonwealth 
v. Murphy, 282 Mass 593, 185 N.E. 486. In that case the 
defendant had sought to show that three other checks 
identical in typing and handwriting with the four of 
which he was accused were passed by someone other than 
himself. The trial court had sustained the state's objection 
to their admissability. The Massachusetts supreme court 
said: 
"No one, we think, will deny that if the evidence 
offered is the truth it well might shake confidence in 
the identifications upon which alone this conviction 
rests.*** It indicates that two others who met the 
man who writes and acts as the defendant is accused 
of doing are ready to testify that he is not the de-
fendant. It does not establish his innocence. The 
handwriting on the seven checks may not all be that 
of one man. Two thieves may have worked together 
to protect one another by following the same plan 
and acting and looking in the same way. It does not 
follow that, because one did not do a thing on Octo-
ber 1, he did not do a similar thing in May and June. 
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Acquittals in two courts do not establish freedom 
from guilt on a different date in a different court. 
Mistake in identification by one person does not 
prove another one wrong. These are considerations 
for a jury. But owing to the ruling (of the trial 
court) no jury has passed upon them. Unless some 
positive rule of law prevents, it would seem that the 
defendant is entitled to have a jury consider the evi-
dence, pass upon its credibility and wright it with the 
evidence of ident~fication upon the issue of guilt." 
In the State v. Bock case, supra, after quoting the above 
from Commonwealth v. Murphey, the court specifically 
concluded that the defendant: 
" ... should also have the right to show that crimes 
of a similar nature have been committed by some 
other person when the acts of such other person are 
so closely connected in point of time and method of 
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of 
defendant as the person who committed the crime 
charged against him. State v. Harris, 153 Iowa 592, 
133 N.W. 1078." 
It seems clear, without possibility of contradiction, that 
the defendant was entitled to show that other similar 
crimes, part of a scheme, plan or design, utilizing the 
same series of checks, payable to the same payee, and 
cashed at about the same time of the month had been 
committed by another, and that the trial courts ruling 
that such checks were inadmissable was clearly wrong. 
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POINT X 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD SEARCHED 
IN THIS AREA FOR THE ALLEGEDLY FICTITIOUS 
PERSON WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
NO SUCH PERSON EXSTED 
Defendant objected to the insufficiency of evidence 
adduced and lack of foundation established to permit the 
officer to testify that no such person could be located in 
the vicinity of Salt Lake County, (R. 440) and to the 
sufficiency of the jury instruction with respect to the 
adequacy of the investigation (R. 589) and pointed out 
that many persons commute to the Salt Lake County 
area from Tooele, Summit County, Davis County, Weber 
County and other areas since area of inquiry did not in-
clude those areas and it may well be that such a person 
does in fact exist in those areas and it may well be that 
such a person does in fact exist in those areas who com-
mutes to the Salt Lake County area but would not be 
located by a search limited to the Salt Lake County area. 
The search made by said officer was limited to calling 
some utilities companies in Salt Lake Valley, looking in 
the telephone book and city directory and checking with 
the office of the secretary of state. (R 440) Such a search 
would be unlikely to reveal the existence of a person who 
rented a furnished apartment which included utilities 
and who had an unlisted telephone number or had no 
telephone. Certainly it would have been reasonable for 
such an investigation to have included a check of the 
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police files, a check with the credit bureau and other 
credit agencies, a check with the dairies and newspapers 
and it would be reasonable to include surrounding areas 
in that investigation. 
If we accept such a superficial investigation to estab-
lish the existence of one of the basic elements of the 
crime which must be proven by the prosecution beyond 
a reasonable doubt are we not setting aside the presump-
tion of innocence guaranteed by the constitution and sub-
stituting in lieu thereof a presumption of guilt. 
No search was made with respect to a Cal J. Coon, al-
though the check charged in the informati'On (Ex. P. 61 
was signed by a Cal J. Coon. The investigation made by 
the officer was limited to a search for a person named 
Carl J. Coon. (R. 588) The prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the person who purported-
ly executed said check is a fictitious person before c. 
criminal offense is proven. The record is completely void 
of any investigation as to the non-existence of a Cal J. 
Coon in the area and accordingly as a matter of law the 
prosecution had failed to prove a vital link in their bur-
den of proof as the conviction should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The actions of the prosecution and the Court in with-
holding and permitting suppression of evidence favorable 
to the accused, in calling 14 surprise witnesses when only 
4 witnesses' names were endorsed on the information, in 
agreeing in open court after demand by defendant for 
names of witnesses to supply names of witnesses and 
failing to do so, in leading the defendant, his counsel and 
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the Court at a motion prior to trial to believe that no 
checks other than the one charged in the information and 
no witnesses concerning checks other than the one 
charged in the information would be called to testify at 
the trial as justification for refusal to make other checks 
of said series and witnesses concerning those checks, all 
of whom were unknown to defendant, and at the same 
time preventing defendant from obtaining access to the 
names of other similar witnesses who could rebut that 
testimony, in admitting evidence by the prosecution that 
the Court has previously ruled to be inadmissable by the 
defendant as justification for withholding that evidence 
from the defendant when demand therefor was made in 
a pre-trial motion, and the inadequacy of the evidence 
bv the prosecution to establish that the maker of the 
d1eck charged in the information was in fact fictitious 
clearly illustrate that the defendant was denied a "fair 
trial." was denied "equal protection under the laws," was 
denied " due process of law" and was unfairly convicted 
of a crime which he did not commit. The verdict and 
judgment should be reversed and set aside and the case 
remanded for a new trial after a preliminary hearing on 
the charge contained in the information and the prosecu-
tion should be ordered to make available to defendant the 
other checks of the same series as the check with which 
he is herein charged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald C. Barker 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
